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Jurisgenerative Constitutionalism:
Procedural Principles for Managing Global
Legal Pluralism
PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN *
ABSTRACT
Global Legal Pluralism recognizes the inevitability (and sometimes
even the desirability) of multiple legal and quasi-legal systems
purporting to regulate the same act or actor. However, the resulting
pluralism—just as inevitably—creates conflicts among norms that are
potentially intractable. Thus, legal systems must address how best to
respond to the realities of pluralism. This inquiry has constitutional
dimensions because it goes to the constitutive character of communities
and their relationships with other communities, be they international,
transnational, national, subnational, or epistemic.
One response to pluralism is jurispathic: “kill off” all competing laws
by declaring that one set of norms—and only one—shall win. This is a
constitutional declaration founded solely on power or messianism, and I
argue that it is both unsatisfying as a normative matter and doomed to
failure as a descriptive one.
Instead, this article offers principles that would undergird a more
jurisgenerative constitutionalism, one that seeks to manage, without
eliminating, the plural voices clamoring to be heard. These principles
can be used to design procedural mechanisms, institutions, and
discursive practices that better respond to the reality of a world of
multiple competing voices. In addition, such principles may bring more
such voices into the constitutional discourse, thereby creating at least the
possibility that enemies can be turned into adversaries, resulting in more
fruitful (and peaceful) constitutional interactions.

* Manatt/Ahn Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
This article is based on a presentation at a conference on transnational societal
constitutionalism held in Turin, Italy in May 2012. It builds on, and includes material
from, my recent book, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND
BORDERS (Cambridge 2012), as well as several articles that preceded the book.
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INTRODUCTION

When two communities or social systems interact, problems of
pluralism
inevitably
arise.
This
is
because
different
communities—whether such communities are defined as international,
national, transnational, nonstate, or epistemic—will often maintain
conflicting normative commitments.
How to respond to such pluralism? This question often gets resolved
in technical legal terms. Indeed, the entire field of conflict of laws
(sometimes called private international law) aims to provide rules to
determine what norms apply in disputes among multiple communities.
These rules often devolve into formalistic questions, such as whether a
particular share certificate memorializing ownership of a company or a
particular Internet server is physically located within the territorial
boundaries of one jurisdiction or another. Yet, the issues of how to
manage pluralism must not be relegated to such technocratic inquiries.
Instead, we need to recognize that the conflict of law analysis is
essentially constitutional in character because it implicates the
constitutive character of communities and their relationships with
either an external or internal “Other.”
In a recent book, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law
Beyond Borders, I surveyed a wide variety of legal conflicts of this sort. 1
In the book, I noted that law often operates based on a convenient
fiction that nation-states exist in autonomous, territorially distinct
spheres and that activities therefore fall under the legal jurisdiction of
only one regime at a time.2 Thus, traditional legal rules have tied
jurisdiction to territory: a state could exercise complete authority within
its territorial borders and no authority beyond them. In the twentieth
century, such rules were loosened, but territorial location remains the
principal touchstone for assigning legal authority.3 Accordingly, if one
could spatially ground a dispute, one could most likely determine the
legal rule that would apply.
But consider such a system in today’s world. Should the U.S.
government be able to sidestep the U.S. Constitution when it houses
prisoners in “offshore” detention facilities in Guantánamo Bay or
elsewhere around the world? Should spatially distant corporations that
create serious local harms be able to escape local legal regulation simply
because they are not physically located in the jurisdiction? When the
1. PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW
BEYOND BORDERS (2012).
2. Id. at 4.
3. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311,
427-32 (2002).
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U.S. government seeks to shut down the computer of a hacker located in
Russia, does the virus transmitted constitute an act of war or a violation
of Russia’s sovereignty? How can we best understand the complex
relationships among international, regional, national, and subnational
legal systems? Does it make sense to think that satellite transmissions,
online interactions, and complex financial transactions have any
territorial locus at all? And in a world where nonstate actors such as
industry standard-setting bodies, nongovernmental organizations,
religious institutions, ethnic groups, terrorist networks, and others
exert significant normative pull, can we build a sufficiently capacious
understanding of the very idea of jurisdiction to address the incredible
array of overlapping authorities that are our daily reality?
Thus, a simple model that looks only to territorial delineations
among official state-based legal systems is now simply untenable (if it
was ever useful to begin with). Thankfully, debates about globalization
have moved beyond the polarizing question of whether the nation-state
is dying or not. However, one does not need to believe in the death of the
nation-state to recognize that physical location can no longer be the sole
criterion for conceptualizing legal authority and that nation-states must
work within a framework of multiple overlapping jurisdictional
assertions by state, international, and even nonstate communities. Each
of these types of overlapping jurisdictional assertions creates a
potentially hybrid legal space that is not easily eliminated.
These spheres of complex overlapping legal authority are, not
surprisingly, sites of conflict and confusion. In response to this hybrid
reality, communities might seek to “solve” such conflicts either by
reimposing
the
primacy
of
territorially-based
(and
often
nation-state-based) authority or by seeking universal harmonization.
Thus, on the one hand, communities may try to seal themselves off from
outside influence by retreating from the rest of the world and becoming
more insular (as many religious groups seek to do), 4 by building
wallseither literal 5 or regulatory 6 to protect the community from
outsiders, by taking measures to limit outside influence (for example,
4. See, e.g., CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF U TOPIA (1980) (discussing such
communities).
5. See, e.g., Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-367 (authorizing the creation of a
700-mile-long, 15-foot-high fence along the United States-Mexico border); Gwynne Dyer,
World Full of Mined and Monitored Walls, GUELPH MERCURY, Feb. 10, 2007, at A11,
available at 2007 WLNR 2679139 (discussing border fences being built in Israel, Thailand,
India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia).
6. See, e.g., Ben Elgin & Bruce Einhorn, The Great Firewall of China, BUSINESSWEEK
ONLINE (Jan. 12, 2006), available at http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/docs/2006-0113_busweek_china_firewall.pdf (describing China’s efforts to control internet content
entering the country).
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U.S. legislation seeking to discipline judges for citing foreign or
international law), 7 or by falling back on territorially-based jurisdiction
or choice-of-law rules. 8 At the other extreme, we see calls for
harmonization of norms, 9 more treaties, 10 the construction of
international governing bodies, 11 and the creation of “world law.” 12
I argue that we should be wary of pinning our hopes on legal
regimes that rely either on reimposing sovereignist territorial insularity
or on striving for universals. Not only are such strategies sometimes
normatively undesirable, but more fundamentally they simply will not
be successful in many circumstances. The influence and application of
foreign norms or foreign decision-making bodies may be useful and
productive or may be problematic, but in any event they are inevitable
and cannot be willed away by fiat.
Therefore, I suggest an alternative response to legal hybridity: we
might deliberately seek to create or preserve spaces for productive
7. See, e.g., Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, 108th
Cong. (2004).
8. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan
Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105 (2005) (criticizing a territorialist approach).
9. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity Among
Trading Nations, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 9, 32-34 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (outlining how concerns about a regulatory
“race-to-the-bottom” leads to calls for international harmonization of regulatory
standards).
10. See, e.g., Erin Ann O’Hara, Choice of Law for Internet Transactions: The Uneasy
Case for Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1883 (2005) (calling for
international harmonization of online consumer protection laws through the vehicle of a
UN convention).
11. For an example of such thinking, consider this statement by Markus Kummer,
Head Secretariat of the United Nations Working Group on Internet Governance, Int’l
Telecomm. Union:
It is a positive sign that countries are discussing how to run the
Internet, since it requires global solutions to its problems. . . .
Governments now feel that the Internet has become so important that
it should be regarded as a matter of national interest. And so they see
the need for getting involved. . . . The governments who want to play a
more active role also see a need for closer international cooperation.
They feel that the United Nations is the natural system of global
governance and they hold the view that a United Nations umbrella
would be a prerequisite to give the necessary political legitimacy to
Internet governance.
Interview with United Nations Head Secretariat of WGIG, C IRCLEID (Jul. 20, 2004 6:34
AM), http:// www.circleid.com/posts/interview_with_united_nations_head_secretariat_of_w
gig/.
12. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, World Law: An Ecumenical Jurisprudence of the Holy
Spirit, at 5, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=666143 (Feb.
2005) (“It is obvious that there cannot be a world community without a body of world law
to maintain both order and justice among its different constituents.”); Harold J. Berman,
World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1617-22 (1995).
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interaction among multiple, overlapping legal systems by developing
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to manage,
without eliminating, the legal pluralism we see around us. Such
mechanisms, institutions, and practices can help mediate conflicts by
recognizing that multiple communities may legitimately wish to assert
their norms over a given act or actor, by seeking ways of reconciling
competing norms, and by deferring to alternative approaches if possible.
And even when a decisionmaker cannot defer to an alternative norm
(because some assertions of norms are repressive, violent, and/or
profoundly illiberal), procedures for managing pluralism can at least
require an explanation of why deference is impossible.
The excruciatingly difficult case-by-case questions concerning how
much to defer to another normative community and how much to
impose the norms of one’s own community are probably impossible to
answer definitively. The crucial antecedent point, however, is that
although people may never reach agreement on norms, they may at
least acquiesce to procedural mechanisms, institutions, or practices that
take pluralism seriously rather than ignoring pluralism through
assertions of territorially-based power or dissolving pluralism through
universalist imperatives. Processes for managing pluralism seek to
preserve spaces of opportunity for contestation and local variation.
Accordingly, a focus on hybridity may at times be both normatively
preferable and more practical precisely because agreement on
substantive norms is so difficult. In any event, the claim is only that the
independent values of pluralism should always be factored into the
analysis, not that they should never be trumped by other
considerations.
Of course, even if pluralist institutions and processes better reflect
the complexity of the world around us, this is not necessarily a reason to
adopt them. Yet, we may find that the added norms, viewpoints, and
participants produce better decision-making, better adherence to those
decisions by participants and nonparticipants alike, and ultimately
better real-world outcomes. And while this may not always be so, the
essential point is that in the design of procedures, institutions, and
discursive practices, these possible benefits need to be considered.
Significantly, although a pluralist approach may not offer
substantive norms, it may favor procedural mechanisms, institutions,
and practices that provide opportunities for plural voices. Such
procedures can potentially help to channel (or even tame) normative
conflict to some degree by bringing multiple actors together into a
shared social space. In addition, including multiple voices may lead to
better substantive outcomes because such multiplicity provides the
possibility for creative alternatives that otherwise might not be heard.
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This pluralist commitment can, of course, have strong normative
implications because it asks decisionmakers and institutional designers
at least to consider the independent value of pluralism. For example,
one might favor a hybrid domestic-international tribunal over either a
fully domestic or a fully international one because it includes a more
diverse range of actors, or one might favor complementarity or
subsidiarity regimes because they encourage dialogue among multiple
jurisdictions. Likewise, one might prefer conflict-of-law frameworks that
recognize the reality of hybridity rather than arbitrarily choosing a
single governing legal regime for problems implicating multiple
communities. In any event, pluralism questions whether a single world
public order of the sort often contemplated by both nation-state
sovereignists and international law triumphalists is achievable, even
assuming it were desirable.
At the same time, mechanisms, institutions, and practices of the
sort I have in mind do require actors to at least be willing to take part in
a common set of discursive forms. This is not as idealistic as it may at
first appear. As Jeremy Waldron has argued, “[t]he difficulties of
intercultural or religious-secular dialogue are often exaggerated when
we talk about the incommensurability of cultural frameworks and the
impossibility of conversation without a common conceptual scheme. In
fact, conversation between members of different cultural and religious
communities is seldom a dialogue of the deaf.”13
Nevertheless, it is certainly true that some normative systems deny
even this limited goal of mutual dialogue. Such systems would correctly
recognize the liberal bias within the vision of procedural pluralism I
explore here, 14 and they may reject the vision on that basis. For
example, while most of those who either support or oppose abortion
rights in the United States could be said to share a willingnessdespite
their differencesto engage in a common practice of constitutional
adjudication, those bombing abortion clinics are not similarly willing.
Accordingly, there may not be any way to accommodate such actors even
within a more pluralist framework. Likewise, communities that refuse
to allow the participation of particular subgroups, such as women or
minorities, may be difficult to include within the pluralist vision I have
in mind. Of course, these groups are undeniably important forces to
13. Jeremy Waldron, Public Reason and “Justification” in the Courtroom, 1 J.L. PHIL.
& CULTURE 107, 112 (2007).
14. This is not to say that the vision of pluralism I explore should be taken as
synonymous with liberalism, though they share many attributes. For a discussion of the
relationship between legal pluralism and liberalism, see Paul Schiff Berman, How Legal
Pluralism Is and Is Not Distinct From Liberalism: A Reply to Denis Patterson & Alexis
Galán, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 801 (2013).
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recognize and take account of as a descriptive matter. But from a
normative perspective, an embrace of a jurisprudence of hybridity need
not commit one to a worldview free from judgment, where all positions
are equivalently embraced. Thus, I argue not necessarily for
undifferentiated inclusion, but for a set of procedural mechanisms,
institutions, and practices that are more likely to expand the range of
voices heard or considered, thereby creating more opportunities to forge
a common social space than either sovereignist territorialism or
universalism.15 In that sense, the vision I pursue here is at least partly
indebted to the proceduralist vision of Jürgen Habermas16 and can be
criticized on similar grounds. Nevertheless, we need not construct ideal
dialogic contexts in order to imagine procedural mechanisms,
institutional designs, and discursive practices for managing pluralism.
Finally, we can view this jurisprudence of hybridity as a form of
fruitful constitutional interaction among multiple communities. Why
constitutional? Because these interactions are fundamentally
constitutive and because they imagine ways to structure permanent
interaction with other communities. Thus, we need to start by
considering (in psychological, sociological, and philosophical terms)
possible ways of conceptualizing the Other. Then, we can identify
procedural principles that would undergird any constitutional design
that seeks to manage, without eliminating, hybridity. These two tasks
are the subject of the next part of this article. In conclusion, I offer some
concrete examples of such a pluralist constitutional design.
I. SELF, OTHER, AND THE NEGOTIATION OF DIFFERENCE
How do we encounter the Other? How do we experience those who
are different? Can we communicate? Can we live in parallel? Can we
learn from those who are different? Can we ignore them? How do we
manage the inevitable jostling that may arise? These are questions that
are simultaneously psychological, sociological, political, and legal and,
therefore, should be addressed on many different levels at once.
One possible response to the encounter with the Other is to focus on
those attributes that make the Other not so different at all. This is the
“we’re all fundamentally the same” gambit we hear so often. And,
interestingly, this focus on sameness can be adopted both by die-hard
nationalists—who use it to insist that “our” norms (whoever the “our”
15. This focus on jurisgenerative structure, rather than on the necessary inclusion of,
or deference to, all points of view, may differentiate legal pluralism as I use it here from
multiculturalism.
16. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS : CONTRIBUTIONS TO
A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
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might be) should govern all—and committed universalists, who use it to
push for uniform norms operating cross-culturally throughout space and
time.
In this same vein, some sociological studies of communication start
from the idea that interpersonal interaction requires both parties in an
encounter to believe (or at least assume) that the other is not truly other
at all. 17 According to this view, most associated with Alfred Schutz, 18
differences in individual perspectives are overcome only if each party
tacitly believes that he or she could effectively trade places with the
other. As Schutz describes it, “I am able to understand other people’s
acts only if I can imagine that I myself would perform analogous acts if I
were in the same situation.”19 Thus, differences in perspective are
reduced to differences in situation. Any, possibly more fundamental,
differences are suppressed to facilitate dialogue.
As a result, the deliberate assuming away of the unfamiliar is seen
as a constant part of everyday life. The unfamiliar is relegated to the
category of “strange,” and “strangeness” necessarily is placed elsewhere,
somewhere other than the interaction at hand. 20 Moreover, Harold
Garfinkel and other ethnomethodologists have argued that individuals
do not simply passively maintain these assumptions but are constantly
engaged in a joint enterprise aimed at sustaining this familiarity. 21 In
all of these studies, the emphasis is on “the human production of
common worlds of meaning as the only axis on which dialogue
rotates.”22
But is that all there is to the experience of the Other? Is it really
imperative constantly to assume that our fellow human beings are
fundamentally identical to us? After all, “[u]nder this principle, if a
dialogue is to take place, strangeness as a phenomenon of everyday
interaction must be considered negatively, namely, as that part of an
encounter that must be constantly ‘assumed away’ by the

17. See generally Z. D. Gurevitch, The Other Side of Dialogue: On Making the Other
Strange and the Experience of Otherness, 93 AM. J. SOC. 1179 (1988).
18. See generally ALFRED SCHUTZ, COLLECTED PAPERS I: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL
REALITY (Maurice Natanson ed., 1962) [hereinafter SCHUTZ, PROBLEM]; ALFRED SCHUTZ,
ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS (Helmut R. Wagner ed., 1970) [hereinafter
SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY]; Alfred Schuetz, The Stranger: An Essay in Social
Psychology, 49 AM. J. SOC. 499 (1944).
19. SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 181.
20. Gurevitch, supra note 17, at 1180 (summarizing arguments in SCHUTZ, PROBLEM,
supra note 18).
21. See, e.g., Harold Garfinkel, Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities,
11 SOC. PROBS . 225 (1964).
22. Gurevitch, supra note 17, at 1180.
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participants.”23 Thus, we are left with a world in which people are
classified either as familiar or as strangers. Even more problematic,
these studies suggest that it will be simply impossible to bridge the
communication gap with those deemed strangers. Yet, as Georg Simmel
noted long ago, the stranger is never truly distant,24 so there will need
to be some way of bridging gaps short of assuming away strangeness
altogether.
On the other hand, we might respond to such encounters with the
Other by retreating to a gated community and trying to lead a
hermetically-sealed existence. Here, the Other remains fully Other, and
no communication is possible.
Both of these responses, when translated to law, are fundamentally
jurispathic. They kill off competing interpretations by authoritatively
saying that this is the law and that is not. So, either a single
nation-state’s norms govern or one universal law governs. Such
jurispathic legal assertions may sometimes be effective, necessary, or
desirable, but they are not the only ways to structure legal relations
among multiple communities. Indeed, they both represent a
fundamental retreat from hybridity. Yet, hybridity is difficult to escape
in a world of overlapping jurisdictions and normative diversity, where—
as the pluralists would say—multiple conflicting legal systems occupy
the same social field. The question therefore often becomes: are there
other approaches to managing pluralism? Can we come up with a more
pluralist constitutional order? What are the constitutional principles we
might apply?
Unlike the universalist approach, a pluralist vision does not require
people to be conceptualized as fundamentally identical in order to be
brought within the same normative system. Nor does a pluralist vision
render outsiders irrelevant, as sovereignist territorialism does. Instead,
pluralism attempts to navigate a different path altogether. A pluralist
constitutional frame asks whether we can seek solutions without
assuming commonality or seek harmonization while preserving the
insistence on difference that contextualists rightly emphasize. In short,
pluralism questions whether we are doomed either to require
commonality or to essentialize difference. Are those truly the only
possible approaches?
Think again of how we encounter a stranger. Do we necessarily see
that stranger as fundamentally the same as we are or fundamentally
different? Might not we see (and celebrate) important differences while
23. Id. at 1181–82.
24. See generally GEORG SIMMEL, The Stranger, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL
402 (Kurt H. Wolff ed., 1950).

674

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2

seeking ways to bridge those gaps so that we might communicate with
each other and live peaceably side by side?
Perhaps we might draw from Hannah Arendt, who offers a different
way of conceptualizing the encounter with the stranger. Instead of
assuming commonality, she seeks, in Understanding and Politics, the
quality that “makes it bearable for us to live with other people,
strangers forever, in the same world, and makes it possible for them to
bear with us.”25 Note that for Arendt, the task is how to “bear with”
strangers, even while recognizing that they will forever be strange. 26
Arendt’s strategy for bearing with strangers is more than just mutual
indifference and more than just toleration as well. It “involves a mental
capacity appropriate for an active relation to that which is distant,” 27
which Arendt locates in King Solomon’s gift of the “understanding
heart.”28 Understanding, according to Arendt, “is the specifically human
way of being alive; for every single person needs to be reconciled to a
world into which he was born a stranger and in which, to the extent of
his distinct uniqueness, he always remains a stranger.” 29 What does
“understanding” entail for Arendt? This is a bit difficult to pin down, but
she makes clear that understanding is not gained through direct
experience of the Other, and it is not just knowledge of the other. 30
Instead, understanding starts from the individual situated apart from
others. Thus, instead of “feeling your pain,” understanding involves
determining what aspects of the pain people feel have to do with politics
and what politics can do to resolve our common dilemmas. Moreover,
“[u]nderstanding can be challenged and is compelled to respond to an
alternative argument or interpretation.”31 In short, understanding in
Arendt’s formulation looks a lot less like empathy and a lot more like
judging. 32
While assuming sameness leads to a universalist harmonization
approach, Arendt’s more distanced conception of the encounter with the
stranger is akin to the pluralist vision I am pursuing as an alternative.
Likewise, consider Iris Marion Young’s idea of “unassimilated
25. HANNAH ARENDT, Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding),
in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING: 1930-1954, at 307, 322 (Jerome Kohn ed., 1994).
26. In focusing on Arendt’s idea of “bearing with strangers,” I draw from the analysis
in Phillip Hansen, Hannah Arendt and Bearing with Strangers, 3 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY
3 (2004).
27. Id. at 3.
28. ARENDT, supra note 25, at 322.
29. Id. at 308.
30. See id. at 313.
31. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Judging Rightly, 47 F IRST THINGS 49, 49 (1994) (reviewing
ARENDT, supra note 25).
32. See ARENDT, supra note 25, at 313.

JURISGENERATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

675

otherness,” which she posits as the relation among people in the ideal
“unoppressive city.”33 Young envisions ideal city life as the
“‘being-together’ of strangers.”34 These strangers may remain strangers
and continue to “experience each other as other.”35 Indeed, they do not
necessarily seek an overall group identification and loyalty. Yet, they
are open to “unassimilated otherness.” 36 They belong to various distinct
groups or cultures and are constantly interacting with other groups.
But, they do so without seeking either to assimilate or to reject those
others. Such interactions instantiate an alternative kind of
community,37 one that is never a hegemonic imposition of sameness but
that nevertheless prevents different groups from ever being completely
outside one another. 38 In a city’s public spaces, Young argues, we see
glimpses of this ideal: “The city consists in a great diversity of people
and groups, with a multitude of subcultures and differentiated activities
and functions, whose lives and movements mingle and overlap in public
spaces.”39 In this vision, there can be community without sameness,
shifting affiliations without ostracism.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGING PLURALISM
With this alternative frame in mind, here’s an initial cut at
translating this pluralist vision into a set of principles for constitutional
design. Significantly, these principles are not derived from any
overarching universal set of truths and do not require a commitment to
universalism. They only require a pragmatic willingness to engage with
other possible normative systems and potentially to restrain one’s own
jurispathic voice for the sake of forging more workable, longer-lasting
relationships and harmony among multiple communities. Sometimes, of
course, such deference to the Other will not be possible; constitutional
33. See Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 300, 317 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (“Our political ideal is
the unoppressive city.”).
34. Id. at 318.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 319.
37. Young resists using the word “community” because of the “urge to unity” the term
conveys but acknowledges that “[i]n the end it may be a matter of stipulation” whether
one chooses to call her vision “community.” Id. at 320. See also Jerry Frug, The Geography
of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1996) (“Unlike Young, I do not cede the term
community to those who evoke the romance of togetherness.”).
38. See Young, supra note 33, at 319 (positing that a group of strangers living side by
side “instantiates social relations as difference in the sense of an understanding of groups
and cultures that are different, with exchanging and overlapping interactions that do not
issue in community, yet which prevent them from being outside of one another”).
39. Id.
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pluralism only seeks to embed habitual practices in which deference is
considered and attempted, not in which it is always implemented. Let’s
see what some of these constitutional principles might be.
First, a pluralist approach to managing hybridity should not
attempt to erase the reality of that hybridity. Indeed, arguably the
desire to “solve” hybridity problems is precisely what has made conflict
of laws such a conceptually unsatisfying field for so long. Each
generation seeks a new way (or often the revival of an old way) to divine
an answer to what is at its root an unanswerable question: which
territorially-based state community’s norms should govern a dispute
that, by definition, is not easily situated territorially and necessarily
involves affiliations with multiple communities?
Second, a pluralist framework recognizes that normative conflict is
unavoidable and so, instead of trying to erase conflict, seeks to manage
it through procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that
might at least draw the participants to the conflict into a shared social
space. This approach draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea that
agreements are reached principally through participation in common
forms of life, rather than through agreement on substance.40 Or, as the
political theorist Chantal Mouffe has put it, we need to transform
“enemies”—who have no common symbolic space—into “adversaries.” 41
Adversaries, according to Mouffe, are “friendly enemies”: friends
because they “share a common symbolic space but also enemies because
they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way.” 42
Ideally, law—and particularly legal mechanisms for managing
hybridity—can function as the sort of common symbolic space that
Mouffe envisions and can therefore play a constructive role in
transforming enemies into adversaries. This is akin to Young’s ideal
city.
Of course, Mouffe might well disagree with my application of her
idea to law. Indeed, in The Democratic Paradox, she writes that “one
cannot oppose, as so many liberals do, procedural and substantial
justice without recognizing that procedural justice already presupposes
acceptance of certain values.”43 Her point is well taken; certainly my
focus on procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices necessarily
limits the range of pluralism somewhat because it requires participants
to accept the principles underlying the values of procedural pluralism
itself. This is, to a large extent, a vision consonant with liberal
40. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 241 (G. E. M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1967).
41. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 13 (2000).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 68.
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principles, and many may reject it on that basis. Alas, there is no way to
extricate oneself from this concern if one wants to have any type of
functioning legal system for negotiating normative difference. Thus, I
argue only that a pluralist framework is more likely to draw
participants together into a common social space than a territorialist or
universalist framework would. As philosopher Stuart Hampshire has
argued, because normative agreement is impossible, “[f]airness and
justice in procedures” are the only virtues that offer even the possibility
for broader sharing.44 Accordingly, the key is to create spaces for such
broader sharing, spaces for turning enemies into adversaries, without
insisting on normative agreement.45
Third, to help create this sort of shared social space, procedural
mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing pluralism should
encourage decisionmakers to wrestle explicitly with questions of
multiple community affiliation and the effects of activities across
territorial borders, rather than shunting aside normative difference. As
a result, a pluralist framework invites questions that otherwise might
not be asked: How are communities appropriately defined in today’s
world? To what degree do people act on the basis of affiliations with
nonstate or supranational communities? How should the various
norm-generating communities in the global system interact so as to
provide opportunities for contestation and expression of difference?
Such questions must be considered carefully to develop mechanisms
that will take seriously the multifaceted interactions of such
communities.
Thus, a pluralist conception makes no attempt to deny the
multi-rooted nature of individuals within a variety of communities, both
territorial and nonterritorial. Accordingly, although a pluralist
conception might acknowledge the potential importance of asserting
universal norms in specific circumstances, it does not require a
universalist belief in a single world community. As a result, pluralism
offers a promising rubric for analyzing law in a world of diverse
normative voices.
Fourth, thinking in pluralist terms forces consideration of so-called
conflicts values, particularly the independent benefit that may accrue
when domestic judicial and regulatory decisions take into account a
44. STUART HAMPSHIRE , JUSTICE I S CONFLICT 53 (2000).
45. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, Tribalism and the Myth of the Framework, in K ARL POPPER:
CRITICAL APPRAISALS 203, 221 (Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald eds., 2004) (“Humans
are enormously curious about each other’s ideas and reasons, and, when they want to be,
they are resourceful in listening to and trying to learn from one another across what
appear to be barriers of cultural comprehensibility, often far beyond what philosophers
and theorists of culture give them credit for.”).
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broader interest in a smoothly functioning overlapping international
legal order, reflecting what Justice Blackmun called “the systemic value
of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill.” 46 For example, U.S. courts give full
faith and credit to judgments rendered in other states even if those
judgments would be illegal if issued by the crediting state. 47 Thus, the
conflicts value of respecting an interlocking national system outweighs
individual parochial interests. Such considerations should always be
part of any mechanism for addressing the overlap of plural legal
systems. Moreover, taking account of these sorts of systemic values
should be seen as a necessary part of how communities pursue their
interests in the world, not as a restraint on pursuing such interests.
After all, if it is true that communities cannot exist in isolation from one
another, then there is a long-term parochial benefit from not insisting
on narrow parochial interest and, instead, establishing mechanisms for
trying to defer to others’ norms where possible.
Fifth, even a system that respects conflicts values will, of course,
sometimes find a foreign law such an anathema that the law will not be
enforced. Or, a local religious practice may be so contrary to state values
that it will be deemed illegal. Or, creating a zone of autonomy for a
particular minority group might so threaten the stability of the larger
community that it cannot be countenanced. Thus, embracing pluralism
in no way requires a full embrace of illiberal communities and practices
or the recognition of autonomy rights for every minority group across
the board. But when such “public policy” exceptions are invoked within
a pluralist framework, they should be treated as unusual occasions
requiring strong normative statements regarding the contours of the
public policy. 48 This means that, as Robert Cover envisioned, a
jurispathic act that “kills off” another community’s normative
46. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522,
555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1948) (stating that the full faith and
credit clause “ordered submission . . . even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of
another State, because the practical operation of the federal system, which the
Constitution designed, demanded it”). See also Milwaukee Cnty. v. M. E. White Co., 296
U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (“In numerous cases this court has held that credit must be given to
the judgment of another state, although the forum would not be required to entertain the
suit on which the judgment was founded.”); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908)
(stating that the judgment of a Missouri court was entitled to full faith and credit in
Mississippi even if the Missouri judgment rested on a misapprehension of Mississippi
law).
48. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (requiring courts to enforce the
judgment or arbitral award unless the agreement is null and void, inoperative, incapable
of being performed, or if enforcing it would be repugnant to the public policy of the
enforcing forum).
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commitment is always at least accompanied by an equally strong
normative commitment. 49 The key point is to make decisionmakers
self-conscious about their necessary jurispathic actions. 50 Only such an
approach has any chance of preventing adversaries from turning into
enemies.
Finally, a pluralist framework must always be understood as a
middle ground between strict territorialism, on the one hand, and
universalism, on the other. The key, therefore, is to try to articulate and
maintain a balance between these two poles. As such, successful
mechanisms, institutions, or practices will be those that simultaneously
celebrate both local variation and international order and recognize the
importance of preserving both multiple sites for contestation and an
interlocking system of reciprocity and exchange. Of course, actually
doing that in difficult cases is a Herculean and perhaps impossible task.
Certainly, mutual agreement about contested normative issues is
unlikely and, as discussed previously, possibly even undesirable. Thus,
the challenge is to develop ways to seek mutual accommodation while
keeping at least some “play” in the joints so that diversity is respected
as much as possible. Such play in the joints also allows for the
jurisgenerative possibilities inherent in having multiple lawmaking
communities and multiple norms.51 Always, the focus is on trying to
forge the sort of shared social space that Mouffe describes for
transforming enemies into adversaries and Young describes as the ideal
city.
Taken together, these principles provide a set of criteria for
evaluating the ways in which legal systems interact. In addition, the
principles could inform a community (whether state-based or not) that
wishes to design mechanisms, institutions, or practices for addressing
hybrid assertions of norms. Of course, such criteria are not exclusive.
For example, a procedure or practice that manages pluralism well but
denies certain norms of fundamental justice might be deemed
problematic, regardless of its embrace of pluralism. Thus, my goal is not
49. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983) (describing judges as inevitably “people of
violence” because their interpretations “kill” off competing normative assertions).
50. See Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts,
and Robert Cover (An Essay on Racial Segregation at Bob Jones University, Patrilineal
Membership Rules, Veiling, and Jurisgenerative Practices), 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 25
(2005) (“[Cover] wanted the state’s actors . . . to be uncomfortable in their knowledge of
their own power, respectful of the legitimacy of competing legal systems, and aware of the
possibility that multiple meanings and divergent practices ought sometimes to be
tolerated, even if painfully so.”).
51. See SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 49 (Robert Post ed., 2006)
(discussing and defining “jurisgenerative processes”).
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to say that embracing pluralism always overrides other concerns. After
all, as mentioned previously, many legal and quasi-legal orders are
repressive and profoundly illiberal, and their norms may be resisted on
those grounds. Instead, the important point is simply that pluralist
considerations should always at least be part of the constitutional
design, inculcating habits of mind that promote deference and restraint.
Accordingly, decisionmakers should always ask: Are there other
normative systems at play here? Should I restrain my jurispathic voice?
Is there some other decisionmaker who might more appropriately speak
to this issue? Are there ways I could develop a hybrid decisional
framework that brings more voices to the table? And how can I design
on-going practices, procedures, or institutional arrangements to
constitutionally embed these inquiries?
III. CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR MANAGING GLOBAL LEGAL
PLURALISM
A. Dialectical Legal Interactions
Constitutions tend to try to demarcate clear hierarchical lines of
authority among different decisionmakers. But a more pluralist
constitutional design might, instead, create opportunities for dialectical
legal interactions. For instance, some who study international law fail
to find real “law” in the international realm because they are looking for
hierarchically based commands backed by coercive power.52 In contrast,
a pluralist approach understands that interactions among various
tribunals and regulatory authorities are more likely to take on a
dialectical quality that is neither the direct hierarchical review
traditionally undertaken by appellate courts, nor simply the dialogue
that often occurs under the doctrine of comity. 53 Thus, we may see
treaty-based courts exert an important influence even as national courts
retain formal independence, much as U.S. federal courts exercising
habeas corpus jurisdiction may well influence state court
interpretations of U.S. constitutional norms in criminal cases. 54 In turn,
the decisions of national courts may also come to influence international

52. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005).
53. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004), for a detailed analysis of such dialectical
regulation.
54. See id. at 2034, 2068.
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tribunals. This dialectical and iterative process 55 can exist without an
official hierarchical relationship based on coercive power.
Three examples illustrate the point. First, we might think of the
relationship between free-trade panels and nation-state courts. For
example, in Loewen Group v. United States, a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunal reviewed the procedures of the
Mississippi courts concerning contract and antitrust claims brought by a
local entity against a Canadian corporation.56 The tribunal criticized the
trial as “so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of justice amounting
to a manifest injustice as that expression is understood in international
law.” 57 In addition, the tribunal criticized the total award, including
$400 million in punitive damages issued by the trial court as “grossly
disproportionate” to the damage actually suffered. 58 While in the end
the NAFTA panel refrained (on standing grounds) from assessing
damages against the United States, 59 there is little reason to think that
liability in similar situations will not be imposed in the future.
Thus, the relevant question for our purposes is how will a domestic
court, faced with a multinational dispute in the future, respond both to
the NAFTA precedents already in place and the threat of possible
NAFTA panel review. Although these NAFTA panels lack formal
authority over the domestic courts they review, they do have the power
to assess damages against federal authorities for violations of the trade
agreement, even if those violations occurred in the context of a domestic
court judgment. Thus, we see plural sources of normative authority: the
domestic court that issues an initial judgment; the NAFTA tribunal that
reviews this judgment for fidelity with the principles of the treaty; and
the federal authorities who, in response to pressure from the NAFTA
tribunal, may in turn put pressure on the domestic court. Robert Ahdieh
has argued that, given these realities, we are likely to see, over time, a
dialectical relationship form between the domestic and international
tribunals, in which those courts pay attention to each other’s
interpretations and, while not literally bound by each other’s decisions,
develop a joint jurisprudence partly in tandem and partly in tension
with each other.60
55. See BENHABIB, supra note 57, at 48 (“Every iteration involves making sense of an
authoritative original in a new and different context. The antecedent thereby is reposited
and resignified via subsequent usages and references.”).
56. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶¶ 1,
3, 42, 46 (June 26, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 442 (2005).
57. Id. ¶ 54.
58. See id. ¶¶ 101, 113.
59. See id. ¶¶ 238-240.
60. See Ahdieh, supra note 53, at 2079-82.
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To see how the sort of dialectical relationship Ahdieh posits might
actually play out, consider interactions between the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) and the constitutional courts of European
Member States. Here, the relationship may seem more hierarchical
because, over the past several decades, the ECHR has increasingly come
to seem like a supranational constitutional court, and its authority as
ultimate arbiter of European human rights disputes has largely been
accepted. 61 Yet, even in this context there appears to be room for
hybridity. As Nico Krisch has documented, domestic courts occasionally
refuse to follow ECHR judgments, asserting fundamental principles
embedded in their own constitutional order and, in general, claiming
the power to determine the ultimate limits to be placed on the authority
of the ECHR. 62 Typical of this dialectical relationship is the statement
by the German Constitutional Court that ECHR judgments have to be
“taken into account” by German courts but may have to be “integrated”
or adapted to fit the domestic legal system. 63 Moreover, the German
Court has gone so far as to say that ECHR decisions must be
disregarded altogether if they are “contrary to German constitutional
provisions.”64
Yet, although such statements make it sound as if conflict between
the ECHR and domestic courts is the norm, the reality has actually
been quite harmonious. As Krisch points out, “despite national courts’
insistence on their final authority, the normal, day-to-day operation of
the relationship with the [ECHR] has lately been highly cooperative,
and friction has been rare.”65 The picture that emerges is one in which
domestic courts and the ECHR engage in a series of both informal and
interpretive mutual accommodation strategies to maintain a balance
between uniformity and dissention. Likewise, as Lisa Conant has
observed, nation-state courts have sought to “contain” the impact of
European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions on national legal orders, even
while formally accepting both the supremacy of EU law and the ECJ’s
role in authoritatively interpreting that law. 66 These sorts of dialectical
relationships, forged and developed over many years, may well reflect
the path yet to be taken by the NAFTA tribunals and domestic courts,
61. See generally Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law,
71 MOD. L. REV. 183 (2008) (discussing the evolution of the European human rights
regime while tracing the interaction of the European Court of Human Rights with
domestic courts in the European Union).
62. See generally id.
63. Id. at 196.
64. Id. at 196-97.
65. Id. at 197.
66. See LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
3 (2002).
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as well as the many other intersystemic interactions at play in the
world today.
Finally, consider the Canadian Constitution, which explicitly
contemplates a dialectical interaction between national courts and
provincial legislatures concerning constitutional interpretation. Section
33’s so-called “notwithstanding” clause permits Parliament or a
provincial legislature to authorize the operation of a law for a five-year
period, even after it has been declared invalid by a court.67 As with the
ECHR example, this provision potentially has a disciplining effect on
the court and encourages a more nuanced iterative process in working
out constitutional norms. It is true of course that the notwithstanding
clause, though often invoked rhetorically, has only rarely actually been
used by provincial governments to continue a judicially invalidated
law.68 Yet, this relative infrequency of use may not be evidence of a
failed constitutional innovation. Instead, it may indicate just the
opposite: that the various institutional actors have sufficiently
internalized this mechanism for managing hybridity such that, as in the
ECHR example, the precipice is rarely reached. 69
In contrast to the dialectical interplay contemplated by the
“notwithstanding clause,” the U.S. Supreme Court has, on multiple
occasions, interpreted the U.S. Constitution to contain an implicit
foreign affairs preemption doctrine that cuts off such interplay. 70 For
67. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 33 (U.K.).
68. For example, the Quebec Parliament overrode the Canadian Supreme Court’s
invalidation of provisions of a language law. See Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712
(Can.). However, outside Quebec the notwithstanding clause has never been used to
overturn a judicial decision. See James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights
Coming Home to Roost? Rights Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN D IEGO L.
REV. 1, 21 (2006). In addition, according to one account, the clause has been disavowed by
successive prime ministers because “[i]ts use has come to be seen as undermining the
Charter, in part because judicial decisions interpreting the Charter have come to be seen
as synonymous with the Charter itself.” Id. at 20.
69. On the other hand, it is possible that “the notwithstanding clause frees Canadian
courts to be less deferential to elected legislatures than they otherwise would have been in
the absence of such a clause, because it allows judges to act on the basis that their
decisions are not final.” Allan & Huscroft, supra note 68, at 21-22 (emphasis added). In
any event, the important point for our purposes is that the clause is structured as a
mechanism for managing the hybridity of multiple communities within a federal system.
See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights and Constitutionalism, 7 J. HUM. R TS. 139,
147-48 (2008), for an account supporting the approach of the notwithstanding clause from
the perspective of political theory.
70. See, e.g., American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (striking down
California law requiring insurance companies doing business in California to disclose any
business activities in Europe during the Nazi Holocaust); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (prohibiting Massachusetts from banning state expenditures
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example, the Court has refused to allow localities to take actions that
were deemed to encroach upon the exclusive national prerogative to
conduct foreign affairs. Yet, one might think that “[in our] democratic
federation . . . local efforts to effectuate protection of rights have a
presumptive validity” authorized by the commitments to multiple voices
protected in a federal system.71 At the very least, courts should carefully
interrogate the claimed justification for preemption to ensure that the
local action at issue poses a real, rather than conjectural, threat to the
federal government’s conduct. 72 After all, pluralism is built into the
structure of federalism, and so actions of localities to import
international or foreign norms or signal solidarity with them should not
easily be displaced.
Indeed, at times we can see the explicit creation of dialectical legal
regimes to manage federalist interactions. For example, take
California’s efforts to impose more stringent automobile fuel efficiency
standards than the federal government’s standards. At first glance, this
might seem to be simply a direct state challenge to federal authority.
However, the entire regime under which California can apply for a
waiver to impose stricter standards is itself a creature of federal law
because it is the Clean Air Act that grants California the special status
in regulating automobile emissions73 and that arguably has contributed
to California’s regulatory leadership in this area.74 Similarly, the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act established a formal mechanism
whereby northeastern states were granted the ability to cooperate in the
control of ozone, but the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
given the power to approve or disapprove any recommendations the
consortium might have.75
on goods and services from any person that had been in business with Burma); Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down Oregon statute that had the effect of
preventing a resident of East Germany from inheriting property probated in the state).
See also Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism
and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31
(2007), for a discussion of these cases.
71. Resnik, supra note 70, at 85.
72. See id. at 87 (“[J]udges ought to adopt a posture of non-encroachment by insisting
on exacting evidence of particular and specific imminent harms before invalidating actions
by localities or by states as those entities determine their own expenditures of funds and
rules.”).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) (2006).
74. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1097, 1109 (2009) (“California’s leadership on climate change issues is not merely the
product of state leadership. California’s climate change regulations are a direct result of
federal law, which has played a central role both in allowing the state to regulate and in
demanding stricter regulation of air pollution.”).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(a).
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Significantly, these provisions, both of which explicitly create
formalized dialectical (or multiscalar) relations between state and
federal authority, may be preferable to a regime that granted either the
states or the federal government sole authority. 76 As Ann Carlson
argues, the federal statutes have, as an initial matter, tended to
encourage the states to ratchet up their environmental protection
beyond what they otherwise might have done. 77 However, the
dialectical scheme has gone further and actually encouraged the
deputized states to become leaders on environmental compliance.
Moreover, by granting such authority to only one state or to a small
group of states, the dialectical scheme reaps the benefits of permitting a
greater field for experimentation than a top-down solution would
ordinarily provide, while at the same time achieving greater national
uniformity than would occur if each state were free to go its own way.
Thus, the pluralist approach of these provisions walks a middle ground
between fully decentralized and fully centralized power and arguably
achieves a better outcome than either.
Likewise, the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 is a
federal statute that authorizes states to divest from companies doing
business in Sudan, but only under certain conditions and in limited
ways, and only until the President certifies that the human rights
abuses committed by Sudan have eased.78 Again, the federal restrictions
address concerns about national uniformity in foreign affairs, but the
Act does not embrace the jurispathic doctrine of foreign affairs
preemption, under which the U.S. Supreme Court altogether foreclosed
Massachusetts’s efforts to divest from companies doing business in
Burma. 79 Instead, the pluralist approach of the statute provides a port
of entry for states to contribute to the formulation of national foreign
policy while guarding against complete devolution of foreign affairs
power. As Perry Bechky has observed:
[S]tate divestment may call attention to an
under-attended concern, influence societal attitudes
about that concern, and build domestic political support
for a more vigorous national response thereto. Congress
76. See generally Hari M. Osofsky, The Future of Environmental Law and Complexities
of Scale: Federalism Experiments with Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act, 32 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL ’Y 79 (2010) (suggesting ways for these multiscalar approaches to evolve in
light of changing environmental law demands).
77. See Carlson, supra note 74, at 1100-01.
78. See Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121
Stat. 2516.
79. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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may reasonably conclude that it wishes to hear state
speech about Darfur as it continually reassesses the
degree of priority to afford Darfur amongst the many
concerns competing for Congressional attention.80

Accordingly, the statutory scheme provides greater opportunity for
intersystemic dialogue, public debate, and creative norm generation by
multiple actors than if either a localist or nationalist solution had fully
triumphed.
These examples all involve dialectical interactions between formal
state or international legal institutions. However, the same dialectical
interactions are possible with regard to nonstate normative standards.
For example, the decisions of arbitral panels may, over time, exert
influence on the decisions of more formal state or international bodies,
and vice versa. In a different context, states may incorporate or adapt
standards of conduct that are part of accreditation schemes
promulgated by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or industry
groups. 81 And more broadly, we might see the creation of monitoring
schemes in general as a kind of pluralist approach because instead of
dictating rules, such monitoring generates oversight and publicity that
can instigate change without a formal hierarchical relationship or
coercive enforcement.
B. Margins of Appreciation
One of the interpretive mechanisms employed by the ECHR to
maintain space for local variation is the oft-discussed “margin of
appreciation” doctrine.82 Unlike the dialectical legal encounter between
the ECHR and the German Constitutional Court, the margin of
appreciation doctrine is an explicit interpretive device employed by the
ECHR to give play to local variation. The idea here is to strike a balance
between deferring to national courts and legislators, on the one hand,
and maintaining “European supervision” that “empower[s the ECHR] to
80. Perry S. Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 823, 826
(2009).
81. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 618-19 (2000) (describing government incorporation of accreditation standards on
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) first promulgated by nongovernmental
entities). See also LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING
PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 92-95 (2011) (proposing such
an accreditation scheme for disciplining private military contractors).
82. See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 316-17 (1997), for a particular
useful, succinct summary. My discussion here largely tracks theirs.
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give the final ruling” on whether a challenged practice is compatible
with the European Convention on Human Rights, on the other.83 Thus,
the margin of appreciation allows domestic polities some room to
maneuver in implementing ECHR decisions in order to accommodate
local variation. How big that margin is depends on a number of factors,
including the degree of consensus among the Member States. For
example, in a case involving parental rights of transsexuals, the ECHR
noted that because there was as yet no common European standard, and
“generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage, the
respondent State must be afforded a wide margin of appreciation.”84
Affording this sort of variable margin of appreciation usefully
accommodates a limited range of pluralism. It does not permit domestic
courts to ignore fully the supranational pronouncement (though, as
discussed previously, domestic courts have sometimes asserted greater
independence). Nevertheless, it does allow space for local variation,
particularly when the law is in transition or when no consensus exists
among Member States on a given issue. Moreover, by framing the
inquiry as one of local consensus, the margin of appreciation doctrine
disciplines the ECHR and forces it to move incrementally, pushing
toward consensus without running too far ahead of it.
Finally, the margin of appreciation functions as a signaling
mechanism, through which “the ECHR is able to identify potentially
problematic practices for the contracting states before they actually
become violations, thereby permitting the states to anticipate that their
laws may one day be called into question.” 85 And of course, there is
reverse signaling as well, because domestic states, by their societal
evolution away from consensus, effectively maintain space for local
variation. As Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter have
observed, “The conjunction of the margin of appreciation doctrine and
the consensus inquiry thus permits the ECHR to link its decisions to the
83. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 276 (1979).
84. X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 144 (1997). See
also Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, 58 (1994)
(finding that the lack of a uniform European conception of rights to freedom of expression
“directed against the religious feelings of others” dictates a wider margin of appreciation).
85. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 82, at 317. See also Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus,
Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133,
141 (1993). See J. G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 81 (2d ed. 1993) (interpreting the ECHR’s statement
in Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 68 (1986), that “‘[t]he
need for appropriate legal measures [to protect transsexuals] should therefore be kept
under review having regard particularly to scientific and societal developments’” as a
“strong hint that while British practice currently satisfied [the Convention], the Court’s
duty to interpret the Convention as a living instrument may lead it to a different
conclusion in the future”), for an example of this type of signaling.
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pace of change of domestic law, acknowledging the political sovereignty
of respondent states while legitimizing its own decisions against
them.”86 A similar sort of interaction could be established by a
constitutional court adopting some form of the classic concept versus
conception distinction87 with regard to the adoption of norms by other
actors. Thus, an entity such as the ECHR could, for example, articulate
a particular concept of rights while recognizing that the way this right
is implemented is subject to various alternative conceptions.
Other legal regimes could also usefully adopt margins of
appreciation. For example, the controversial agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights could be
interpreted to incorporate a margin of appreciation. Such a flexible
approach might allow developing countries more leeway in trying to
make sure that access to knowledge in their countries is not unduly
thwarted by stringent intellectual property protection.
C. Subsidiary Schemes
Subsidiarity is another mechanism for managing the interactions
among different legal or quasi-legal authorities. The Catholic Church
first developed subsidiarity as an ordering principle designed to prevent
so-called higher levels of authority from interfering unduly with the
“internal life of a community.”88 But, unlike a constitutional order based
on nation-state sovereignty, a subsidiarity regime does not pose an
outright bar to governance at a “higher,” supranational level of
authority. But, it does not offer a blank check either. The idea is to
foster careful and repeated consideration of other potential lawmaking
communities. Thus, “at its core the principle of subsidiarity requires any
infringements of the autonomy of the local level by means of
pre-emptive norms enacted on the higher level to be justified by good

86. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 82, at 317.
87. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 71 (1986) (discussing the difference
between “concept” and “conception” as “a contrast between levels of abstraction at which
the interpretation of the practice can be studied”).
88. See Catechism of the Catholic Church ¶ 1883, VATICAN.VA, http://www.vatican.va/
archive/ENG0015/__P6G.HTM (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (quoting John Paul II,
Centesimus Annus ¶ 48 (May 1, 1991), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father
/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html#2S) (“[A] community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a
community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support
it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of
society, always with a view to the common good.”).
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reasons.”89 Accordingly, it is not enough for a supranational governance
rule simply to be a good idea; the supranational lawmaking community
also must consider whether the rule is one that is appropriately enacted
at the supranational level, given contrary local policies.
For example, consider the case of a higher-level authority that
enacts an emissions cap to combat global climate change but runs up
against a lower-level authority that performed its own cost-benefit
analysis and determined that it was better for the local economy not to
create such a stringent restriction. 90 Here, the collective action problems
inherent in the lower-level authority’s parochial cost-benefit analysis
would probably justify intervention at the higher level. In contrast, a
higher-level rule limiting nicotine consumption might not override a
more permissive local rule because the locality can plausibly decide it
wants to bear the higher health care costs or other consequences that
might result.
As with all mechanisms for managing hybridity, the line-drawing
problems are potentially difficult and often politically contested, but
even the habits of mind generated by thinking in terms of subsidiarity
can help ensure that lawmaking communities at least take into account
other potentially relevant lawmaking communities.91 Moreover,
subsidiarity can help “local populations . . . better preserve their sense
of social and cultural identity”92 while still allowing for the possibility
that higher-level governmental authority might sometimes be
89. Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist
Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 921 (2004).
90. See id. at 923-24, for a similar hypothetical example.
91. I realize that my discussion of subsidiarity has a functionalist cast and therefore
may seem to deemphasize other concerns, such as democratic legitimacy or the
nation-state’s claims to loyalty as against supranational institutions. See, e.g., Peter L.
Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism:
The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 669 (1999) (arguing
that a functionalist approach “is clearly inadequate to understanding the full import of the
subsidiarity principle” because it tends to ignore important issues of legitimacy); Paul D.
Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
616, 618 (1994) (“[T]he underlying logic of subsidiarity reduces the claim of rightful
governance to a technocratic question of functional efficiency that will eventually undercut
the nation-state’s claims to loyalty.”). However, the sort of dialogue that mechanisms for
managing hybridity encourage need not be “technocratic” and can in fact engage with
precisely the questions of legitimacy and community ties that critics want. Thus, I argue
only for mechanisms that enhance dialogue; I do not circumscribe the content of that
dialogue. Nevertheless, to the extent that critics of a functionalist account of subsidiarity
are trying to raise a sovereigntist objection to supranationalism in general, the pluralist
framework I pursue here clearly rejects such a position as both normatively undesirable
and impractical. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV . 331, 341 (1994).
92. See Bermann, supra note 91, at 341.
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necessary. Finally, even though a subsidiarity regime sets the default in
favor of local decisions, requiring articulated justifications to override
the presumption, subsidiarity-related concerns can sometimes actually
strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the higher-level authority. This
is because, when the higher authority does override local regulation, it
presumably does so only after carefully considering local practices and
only after articulating reasons to justify such an override.93
Accordingly, the institutional processes of subsidiarity aim to ensure
dialogue among multiple legal communities, leading ideally to increased
acceptance of each. Not surprisingly, subsidiarity has been proposed as
a more general model for international law as well. 94 Indeed, the
complementarity regime of the International Criminal Court—whereby
the Court only takes jurisdiction if the local state is unwilling or unable
to investigate—can be seen as a form of subsidiarity scheme.
D. Hybrid Participation Arrangements
Sometimes hybridity can be addressed not so much through the
relationships among multiple communities and their decisionmakers as
through hybridizing the decision-making body or process itself. For
example, from 1190 until 1870, English law used the so-called mixed
jury, or jury de medietate linguae, with members of two different
communities sitting side by side to settle disputes when people from the
two communities came into conflict.95 Sir Edward Coke attributed this
practice “to the Saxons, for whom ‘twelve men versed in the law, six
English and an equal number of Welsh, dispense justice to the English
and Welsh.’”96 Regional differences, however, were not the only type of
community variation recognized in the mixed-jury custom. Mixed juries
were also used in disputes between Jews and Christians,97 city and
93. See Kumm, supra note 89, at 922 (“If there are good reasons for deciding an issue
on the international level, because the concerns addressed are concerns best addressed by
a larger community, then the international level enjoys greater jurisdictional
legitimacy.”).
94. See, e.g., id. at 921-22.
95. Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De
Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 781 (1994);
see also MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER 7-8 (1994) (explaining the practice
of mixed juries in early England).
96. CONSTABLE, supra note 95, at 17 (referencing S IR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART
OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND § 234 (1628)).
97. See id. at 18-21 (noting that half-Jewish, half-Christian juries heard suits between
Jews and non-Jews in England during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries); Ramirez,
supra note 95, at 783-84 (arguing that mixed juries originated in part from the king’s
desire to protect Jewish capital, which was subject to high assessments and escheatment
to the Crown, rather than lose it to Christians in an unfair trial).

JURISGENERATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

691

country dwellers, 98 and merchants and nonmerchants. 99 In the United
States, the custom of mixed juries was imported from England and used
in disputes between settlers and indigenous people,100 as well as in
other interjurisdictional disputes at least through the beginning of the
twentieth century. 101 Karl Llewellyn’s proposal that merchant experts
sit as a tribunal to hear commercial disputes relies on a similar idea
that specialized communities may possess relevant knowledge or
background that should be called upon in rendering just verdicts.102
The principles underlying mixed juries can still be found today.
Indeed, the line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving peremptory
challenges of jurors, though framed in terms of the individual right to
serve on a jury, could be seen as responding in part to the broader idea
that jury panels should reflect both racial and gender diversity. 103
Indeed, research indicates that racially mixed juries tend to deliberate
longer, consider more facts, raise more questions, and discuss more
racial issues than all-white juries. 104 In addition, racially mixed juries
make fewer factual errors than single-race juries, and when factual
inaccuracies do arise, they are more likely to be corrected in racially
mixed juries than in single-race juries.105
98. See CONSTABLE, supra note 95, at 17 (recounting an action involving a country
dweller in twelfth-century London that required that at least one of the jurors be of “the
county in which the foreigner dwells”).
99. See id. at 23-25 (exploring the evolution of “mixed merchant juries” in early
England); Ramirez, supra note 95, at 784-86 (recognizing the king’s regard for foreign
merchants, which prompted the use of mixed juries in order to promote a “perception of
fairness” to outsiders and attract their capital and goods).
100. See Katherine A. Hermes, Jurisdiction in the Colonial Northeast: Algonquian,
English and French Governance, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST . 52, 64-65 (1999) (discussing the
implementation of a mixed-jury system in colonial Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Massachusetts).
101. See Ramirez, supra note 95, at 790 (noting that “[a]t various times between 1674
and 1911, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and
South Carolina each provided for mixed juries”).
102. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 512-15 (1987) (describing Llewellyn’s merchant
tribunal proposal).
103. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (ruling that prosecutors may not
challenge jurors solely on the basis of race); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31
(1994) (extending Batson to peremptory challenges based on gender).
104. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About
Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 C HI.-KENT L. REV.
997, 1028 (2003).
105. See id.; Hiroshi Fukurai, Social De-Construction of Race and Affirmative Action in
Jury Selection, 11 LA RAZA L.J. 17, 20 (1999) (“Jury research shows that racially
heterogeneous juries are more likely than single race juries to enhance the quality of
deliberations. A number of empirical studies . . . show that racially mixed juries minimize
the distorting risk of bias.”).
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In the human rights arena, hybrid domestic/international courts
maintain the tradition of the mixed jury. 106 Such hybrid courts have
been employed in transitional justice settings in Kosovo, East Timor,
Sierra Leone, and Cambodia. In these courts, domestic judges—ideally
drawn from the multiple political, racial, or ethnic groups involved in
the larger geopolitical conflict—sit alongside international judges, and
domestic and international lawyers also work together to prosecute the
cases. 107
As Stephen Krasner has theorized, the sort of “shared
sovereignty”108 reflected in the hybrid court structure can be
particularly important when domestic institutions are weak. He argues
that shared sovereignty can “gird new political structures with more
expertise, better-crafted policies, and guarantees against abuses of
power.” 109 Following this logic, the Dayton Accords effectively made the
Bosnian Constitutional Court a hybrid court, authorizing the president
of the European Court of Human Rights to appoint three non-Bosnian
judges to the nine-member court. 110 A different kind of hybrid is the
Israeli Supreme Court, which has, since its inception, customarily had
at least one member who is an expert in Jewish law.111
We can also see hybrid arrangements outside the judicial context.
For example, in the oil pipeline agreement between Chad and the World
Bank, the two parties share control and governance of the project. 112 As
a condition for its participation, the World Bank insisted on a revenue
management plan aimed at ensuring that the proceeds of oil
development would be used for socioeconomic development. 113 To that
end, the plan contains important limitations on how the expected oil

106. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM . J. INT ’L L. 295
(2003) (discussing hybrid courts generally and their attempts to provide mixed panels of
judges to hear cases).
107. See id. at 295.
108. Stephen D. Krasner, Building Democracy After Conflict: The Case for Shared
Sovereignty, 16 J. DEMOCRACY 69, 76 (2005) (“Shared sovereignty involves the creation of
institutions for governing specific issue areas within a state—areas over which external
and internal actors voluntarily share authority.”).
109. Id. at 70.
110. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with
Annexes, annex 4, art. VI, ¶ 1(a), Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75.
111. See, e.g., Donna E. Arzt, Growing a Constitution: Reconciling Liberty and
Community in Israel and the United States, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 253, 257 (1994).
112. See Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the
Resource Curse in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 38-46 (2005), for a useful
description of the terms of the project.
113. See id. at 40.
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revenue can be invested and spent.114 In addition, oversight of the
revenue plan is shared. Both the World Bank and the government of
Chad must approve the annual expenditure of revenues, and there is a
nine-member oversight committee, seven of whom represent the
government while two represent civil society.115 The committee annually
publishes a review of operations, and those operations are subject to
external audit. 116 Finally, the World Bank’s International Advisory
Group and Inspection Panel retain oversight power over the entire
venture. 117 Whether such measures will result in effective hybrid
governance remains to be seen. But significantly, most of the criticisms
of the plan thus far tend to focus on the particular terms of the shared
sovereignty arrangement, not the hybrid structure itself.118
E. Jurisdictional Redundancies
Many of the legal conundrums of a hybrid world arise because of
jurisdictional redundancy. That is because multiple legal communities
frequently seek to assert jurisdiction over the same act or actor. Yet,
while this jurisdictional overlap is frequently viewed as a problem
because it potentially creates conflicting obligations and uncertainty, we
might also view jurisdictional redundancy as a necessary adaptive
feature of a multivariate, pluralist legal system. Indeed, jurisdictional
redundancy may itself be thought of as a mechanism for managing
pluralism because the existence of overlapping jurisdictional claims
often leads to a nuanced negotiation—either explicit or
implicit—between or among the various communities making those
claims.

114. See id. at 41-42 (“In the course of the first ten years of production, that is, between
2004 and 2013, income taxes will constitute sixteen percent of total revenues to Chad and
the rest will come from royalties and dividends. The government is given discretion on
how to spend the revenues from income taxes subject to the limitation that they be used
for general development purposes. The government has less liberty when it comes to
royalties and dividends. A Special Revenue Account is created in which they would be
deposited. A distribution formula has also been specified. Ten percent of the money will be
kept in international financial institutions as a fund for future generations. Eighty-five
percent of the remaining ninety percent will be deposited in local commercial banks and is
dedicated to the financing of programs in five important sectors namely, education, health
and social services, rural development, infrastructure, and environment and water
resources. The remaining fifteen percent would be devoted to the development of the oilproducing Doba region.”).
115. Id. at 42.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 43-46, for a summary of criticisms.
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In focusing on the pluralist opportunities inherent in jurisdictional
redundancy, I echo the insights of Robert Cover in his article, The Uses
of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation.
Although his essay was focused particularly on the variety of “official”
law pronouncers in the U.S. federal system, Cover identified some of the
benefits that accrue from having multiple overlapping jurisdictional
assertions, regardless of the context. Such benefits include a greater
possibility for error correction, a more robust field for norm articulation,
and a larger space for creative innovation. 119 And though Cover
acknowledged that it might seem perverse “to seek out a messy and
indeterminate end to conflicts which may be tied neatly together by a
single authoritative verdict,” he nevertheless argued that we should
“embrace” a system “that permits the tensions and conflicts of the social
order” to be played out in the jurisdictional structure of the system. 120
Thus, Cover's pluralism, though here focused on U.S. federalism, can be
said to include the creative possibilities inherent in multiple
overlapping jurisdictions asserted by both state and nonstate entities in
whatever context they arise.
More recently, Judith Resnik has noted the “multiple ports of entry”
that a federalist system creates121 and has argued that what constitutes
the appropriate spheres for “local,” “national,” and “international”
regulation and adjudication changes over time and should not be
essentialized.122 Not surprisingly, other commentators have at times
advocated
what
amounts
to
a
federalist
approach
to
national/supranational relations.
CONCLUSION
Once we take Global Legal Pluralism as our framework for analysis,
we are better able to imagine procedural mechanisms, institutional
designs, and discursive practices that are better suited to a reality of
legal hybrids and overlaps. These principles can be thought of as
constitutional because they address the fundamental constitutive terms
under which multiple communities interact. In this essay, I have
119. See id.
120. Id. at 682.
121. See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues,
and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
122. See Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 465,
473 (1996) (“My point is not only that particular subject matter may go back and forth
between state and federal governance but also that the tradition of allocation itself is one
constantly being reworked; periodically, events prompt the revisiting of state or federal
authority, and the lines move.”).
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outlined both the constitutional principles that a pluralist approach
calls forth as well as several examples of pluralist mechanisms already
in existence.
A constitutional pluralist jurisprudence of hybridity does not, of
course, make it any easier to reach actual decisions in individual cases.
Indeed, determining when to defer to a foreign norm and when not,
when to allow a margin of appreciation and when not, when to carve out
zones of autonomy and when to encroach on them: these are all issues
that are probably impossible ever to resolve satisfactorily. And I do not
suggest that merely adopting a more inclusive set of jurisprudential or
institutional mechanisms will eliminate clashes among normative
communities. Such clashes are both inevitable and unlikely ever to be
dissolved.
But the relevant question, it seems to me, is not whether law can
eliminate conflict, but whether it has a chance of mediating disputes
among multiple communities. And this question becomes increasingly
important as normative communities increasingly overlap and intersect.
Accordingly, instead of bemoaning the messiness of jurisdictional
overlaps, we should accept them as a necessary consequence of the fact
that communities cannot be hermetically sealed off from each other.
Moreover, we can go further and consider the possibility that this
jurisdictional messiness might, in the end, provide important systemic
benefits by fostering dialogue among multiple constituencies,
authorities, levels of government, and nonstate communities. In
addition, jurisdictional redundancy allows alternative ports of entry for
strategic actors who might otherwise be silenced.
Most fundamentally, all of this interaction is elided or ignored if we
continue to think and speak as if legal and quasi-legal spheres can be
formally differentiated from each other or as if we will one day all be
able to live under a single overarching legal system. Instead, we need to
accept and perhaps even celebrate the potentially jurisgenerative and
creative role law might play in a plural world. Indeed, it is only if we
take multiple affiliation seriously, if we seek dialogue across difference,
and if we accept unassimilated otherness that we will have some hope of
navigating the hybrid legal spaces that are all around us.

